Abstract-This paper observes different methods for network covert channels constructing and describes the scheme of the packet length covert channel. The countermeasure based on random traffic padding generating is proposed. The capacity of the investigated covert channel is estimated and the relation between parameter of covert channel and counteraction tool is examined. Practical recommendation for using the obtained results are given.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE IDEA of covert channel was introduced by Lampson in 1973 . The covert channel is a communication channel that was not intended for information transfer at all, such as the service program's effect on the system load [1] . It is obvious that covert channel may lead to information leakage and it cannot be eliminated by techniques to detect network anomalies [2] , malware activities [3] , etc. TCSEC postulates that the covert channel is a communication channel which allows the transfer of data and violation of security policy [4] .
Presently, the most popular covert channels are built on packet switching data networks because of some features available in the TCP/IP protocol suite [5] . Moreover, traditional security measures based on traffic encryption also permit the design of different types of covert channels.
Covert channels are divided by the data transfer technique into two classes such as, timing and storage channels [4] . Storage channel allows the direct or indirect storage recording by one process and the direct or indirect reading of it by another. Timing channel allows one process to signal information to another process by modulating of system resources (e. g. CPU time) usage so that the change in response time observed by the second process would provide information.
The first technique to design a storage channel in the IP network is to modulate packet header fields, e. g. TTL [6] , IP ID [7] , ToS [8] . The second technique is based on the modification of the packet length. Different timing channels in the IP networks use alteration of the inter-packet delays [9] , [10] , e. g. by JitterBug [11] and packet transfer rate [12] . In addition, the packet reordering could be used to build a timing channel [13] . Timing channel is a channel with noise since a packet timing is a random variable whose distribution depends on the network load [14] .
A capacity of undetectable packet size covert channels can be higher than a capacity of timing channels, therefore these channels can lead to a serious security breach. The authors of the paper research this type of covert channels and propose the technique to estimate and limit their capacity which can be useful in different types of information systems, e.g. in data storage system in a cloud [15] .
Our Contribution. Since a technique to choose the quantitative characteristics of countermeasures in order to keep balance between capacity of covert and communication channels has not yet been proposed, we offer an approach to gain it. This paper describes a technique to estimate and limit the capacity of a packet size covert channel based on random traffic padding generation. The investigation carried out is significant because such type of covert channels could be constructed even if data encryption is used. There are complicated undetectable covert channels which have no noise in contrast to timing channels. This paper is organized as follows. It gives an analysis of different types of packet size covert channels. The investigated covert channel scheme and the counteracting technique are shown. Then the capacity of the covert channel is estimated and the technique to generate dummy packets is given. The main results and further research guidelines are summed up in the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
For the first time Padlipsky [16] and Girling [17] suggested to modulate the length of data link layer frames in order to accomplish the hidden data transfer. The main idea of the technique is as follows: sender and receiver share the rule used to compose a byte of the covert message depending on the frame length. To describe any byte of the transmitted message, one should use 256 different frame lengths.
Yao constructed a covert channel in which a sender and a receiver shared the periodically updated matrix with elements representing unique unsorted packet lengths in 2008 [18] . The sender using the bits of hidden transmitted message determines the matrix row and randomly chooses a packet length from the row. The receiver finds the gained packet length in the matrix and reconstructs bits of the message according to the row number. Because packet length distribution given by covert channel is not equal to packet length distribution of normal traffic, this type of covert channel is detectable.
Ji suggested a protocol-independent covert channel in 2009 [19] . Before the transmission starts, sender and receiver form the dynamically updated reference of packet lengths by fixing packets lengths in normal traffic. In order to transfer a hidden message the sender transmits a special packet. The length of the special packet is chosen from the reference using the algorithm known to the sender and receiver. The length of the next packet is a sum of lengths of the previous packet and the number corresponding to the message bits. The reference is updated by adding the length of the transmitted packet. The receiver recovers the message bits by evaluating the difference of the packets length gained. The disadvantage of the covert channel is as follows: the lengths of hidden messages are added to the reference, therefore the packet length distribution with the covert channel is not equal to packet length distribution of the normal traffic and this type of covert channels is detectable in case of the large data volume.
Ji worked out another protocol-independent covert channel in 2009 [20] . Before the transmission starts, sender and receiver form a non-updating reference of packet lengths by fixing packets lengths in the normal traffic. The main advantage of the technique is a small space and time complexity of the decoding, since the sender stores the whole reference and receiver saves only the lower and upper bound of each basket. To transmit the hidden data the sender randomly chooses the packet length from the basket, the receiver determines the number of the basket and restores the message bits. The regularity in the distribution of the transmitted message bits could cause a highly probable detection of the channel.
Hussain improved the technique and designed high capacity covert channel based on the alteration of packets lengths and information content in 2011 [20] . Sender and receiver share periodically updated matrix with elements representing unsorted packet lengths in normal traffic. The sender using bits of hidden message determines the matrix row and randomly chooses the packet length from the row. If the chosen length belongs to the stego-column, then the data is transferred in the information content of the packet, otherwise the data is transferred in the number of matrix row. The receiver finds the length of gained message in the matrix, detects the transfer method using the matrix row and recovers bit of the message. The disadvantage of the channel is that information content of the packet has to be used as the hidden container and is more complicated in comparison with the other techniques.
Edekar improved the method in 2013 [22] and realized it using TCP. Packets lengths in the shared matrix are unique. Each matrix element a is associated with the binary vector (v, y), where v = 1 ⇔ a belongs to the stego-column and y = 1 ⇔ a belongs to the stego-row. Then if (v, y) = (1, 1) the packet is ignored; if (v, y) = (1, 0) data is transferred in the packet information content; if (v, y) = (0, 0) data is transmitted in the number of the matrix row; if (v, y) = (0, 1) data is transferred in the number of the matrix row and the packet information content.
The way to eliminate covert channels based on length of transferred packets modulation is to equalize packets lengths and send packets with maximum length. However, the technique essentially diminishes the capacity of a communication channel. To limit a covert channel capacity, the random increase of packet lengths and generation of dummy packets can be used. Kiraly suggested the realization of the methods based on IPsec in 2008 in order to make traffic nontraceable [23] .
However, a technique to choose the quantitative characteristic of the methods in order to keep balance between capacity of covert and communication channels has not yet been proposed. The authors of this paper offer an approach to gain it.
III. THE COVERT CHANNEL SCHEME Let the lengths of transferred packets possess the values from l f ix to l f ix + L. The disjoint sets L 0 and L 1 are given and
where N a stands for the set of positive integers from 1 to a.
Further, we consider a method to build a binary covert channel. In order to transfer «0» the sender communicates a packet with length l ∈ L 0 , to transfer «1» the sender communicates a packet with length l ∈ L 1 . It is obvious that the capacity of such a channel without counteraction is equal to 1 bit per packet. A large-scale site loses about 26 Gb of data annually if there is a covert channel with such a capacity [24] .
If the symbol distribution in a transmitted message simulates a uniformly distributed random sequence (e.g. cryptographic keys sending), a random equiprobable choice of packets lengths from L 0 and L 1 leads to equally probable random distributed lengths of transmitted packets. Moreover, L 0 and L 1 could be periodically changed multisets so that a random choice of packets lengths from L 0 and L 1 induces the distribution of packets lengths to be close to the empirically obtained distribution of normal traffic.
To build such a covert channel, the sender must have one of the following possibilities:
• to modify lengths of transmitted messages;
• to form packets with undefined lengths;
• to buffer packets to be sent and transfer them to a channel at a specified moment. The investigation proposes a technique to limit the capacity of covert channel based on random traffic padding. After i data packets have been sent, random length dummy packets are created, the number of packets i between dummy packets is the value of random variable that is uniformly distributed at the N k , k ∈ N where k is the parameter of a counteraction tool. Let µ be the capacity of a communication channel, then a counteraction tool decreases the capacity of a communication channel and it equals
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IV. THE CAPACITY OF THE COVERT CHANNEL
In 1987 Millen was the first to suggest the use of information theory to estimate a capacity of covert channels with noise [26] . The investigation was continued by Ventakraman [27] . The authors determine network covert channels and analyze techniques to audit and limit a capacity of covert channels utilizing indirect routing.
The capacity C of the investigated covert channel is
where I(X, Y ) is the mutual information of random variables describing the input and output properties of the covert channel properly, the dimensionality of covert channel capacity is one bit per packet. Let us consider the case when synchronization is done more rarely than a dummy packet sending, i. e. T > k. After a dummy packet is received, mismatch between sender and receiver occurs, therefore identification of the following received bits would be wrong until the next synchronization happens. Consequently, in order to build a covert channel the inequality T < k + 1 is required.
Let the synchronization be not less frequent than dummy packet sending, i. e. T < k + 1. Corresponding choice of parameters is explained in Fig. 1 . Since each T -th packet sent via a covert channel is not a data packet but a synchronization packet, the mutual information can be calculated using the following formula
where I * (X, Y ) is a mutual information of random variables describing the input and output properties of a covert channel without synchronization accordingly.
The mutual information I * (X, Y ) is equal to the form of
where the entropy of random variable Y is
the conditional entropy of random variable Y comparatively to random variable X is expressed as
(p(y|x) log 2 p(y|x)) )) .
Since sizes of sets L 0 and L 1 are equal and lengths of passing through the covert channel dummy packets are chosen randomly and equiprobable, then
Whereas the values of conditional probabilities p(x|y), x, y ∈ {0, 1} depend on the number of packets sent via a covert channel between the moment of synchronization and the moment of dummy packet receiving, the mutual information I * (X, Y ) can be found using the following formula
where H i (Y |X) is the conditional entropy of random variable Y compared to random variable X and it is evaluated when i packets received between a moment of synchronization and the dummy packet's arrival. The mutual information I(X, Y ) could be estimated as
where
Since
then
In order to analyze functions f 
could be approximated by means of functions f
Now we explain how to gain the approximate value of the sum T −2 ∑ i=0 f 2,+ (i) and the other sum can be estimated in a similar,
Values of the integrals could be found using the variable substitution and integration by parts
2T −3
It follows that
Graphs of function I(X, Y ) from k where T ∈ {2, 3, 4} are illustrated in Fig. 2 . To build a covert channel the parameter T is chosen while I(X, Y ) has a maximum value. Fig. 2 shows that when k ∈ {2, ..., 6}, parameter T should be equal to 2, when k ∈ {7, ..., 14}, parameter T should be equal to 3.
V. THE PRACTICAL USING OF THE OBTAINED RESULTS
Let functioning of a covert channel with capacity less than v max has no influence upon security (the dimensionality of v max is one bit per sec) and the capacity of communication channel is µ bits per sec. Hence if the average length of transmitted packets isl bits, then the residual communication channel capacity is
packets per sec. In case of the full using of the communication channel by the sender and the receiver the capacity of the covert channel is v = (k + 1)µC (k + 3)l (27) bits per sec, where C is the capacity of covert channel with the dimensionality bits per packet. Therefore when the allowable capacity of covert channel in limited, the following inequality is true v ≤ v max . For example, according to [4] the functioning of a covert channel with capacity less than v max = 100 bits per sec can be acceptable in some cases. Let the capacity of the communication channel be µ = 100 Mbits per sec (standard 100Base-T). The maximum length of IP packet is 65535 bytes, from which 20 bytes is a header length (l f ix = 20 bytes and L = 65515 bytes). Then the average length of sending packets isl = 262220 bits in case of random equipropable choice of packets lengths from equinumerous sets L 0 and L 1 . Table I presents the relation between parameters of the covert channel and the counteraction tool (the symbol «*» means that the value of v is round up to 2 digits). Table I shows that in order to limit the capacity of covert channel up to 100 bits per sec the parameter of counteraction tool should be k = 5.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work the capacity of a packet size covert channel was examined using the information theory statements. The counteraction tool based on random traffic padding generating was designed. We proposed selecting the parameter of the counteraction tool when an allowable covert channel capacity is given.
The topic of the further work is to estimate the residual capacity in multi-symbol covert channels with traffic padding and to investigate the technique to limit covert channel capacity by random increase of packets sizes.
